What I Learned From Being a Planner in an Advisory Command: Reflections From the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine

Key Takeaways

• Advisory planning adds a third major actor to operations.
• Lack of command requires broader, less detailed option sets.
• Mission analysis time rose to ~50% of planning cycle.
• FAOs and design thinking improve partner force understanding.
• Red teaming and “Four Ways” mitigate mirror imaging.

Summary

The Security Assistance Group‑Ukraine (SAG‑U) spent six months coordinating training and equipment for Kyiv, confronting the unique demands of advisory planning. Planners had to juggle three major actors—U.S., Ukrainian, and Russian forces—while lacking direct command over Ukrainian units. To cope, SAG‑U created an ad‑hoc operational planning team, expanded mission‑analysis time to roughly half the planning cycle, and infused design‑thinking and red‑team techniques. These adaptations helped align U.S. assistance with Ukraine’s actual capabilities and risk tolerance, delivering more actionable guidance to both NATO donors and Ukrainian commanders.

Pulse Analysis

The establishment of the Security Assistance Group‑Ukraine in late 2022 marked a strategic shift in how the United States supports allied forces under fire. Rather than deploying combat troops, the U.S. created a three‑star headquarters tasked with synchronizing training, equipment deliveries, and donor coordination for Kyiv. This advisory model placed planners in a delicate balance: they had to understand not only Russian threat dynamics but also Ukrainian operational preferences, all while operating without direct command authority. The result was a hybrid planning environment where traditional MDMP and JPP processes required augmentation to remain effective.

Within SAG‑U, planners quickly recognized that a three‑actor battlefield demanded a broader analytical lens. An ad‑hoc Operational Planning Team merged intelligence (J2), operations (J3), and planning (J5) expertise, allowing a more holistic view of the operational environment. Mission analysis expanded to consume roughly 50 % of the planning timeline, incorporating qualitative factors such as Ukrainian doctrine, leadership styles, and risk tolerance. The inclusion of Foreign Area Officers and the adoption of design‑thinking tools—like the “Four Ways of Seeing”—helped avoid the pitfall of mirror imaging, ensuring that U.S. recommendations reflected the partner’s real capabilities and cultural nuances.

The SAG‑U experience offers a template for future U.S. advisory missions. By treating partner forces as equal analytical subjects and embracing flexible, scenario‑based planning, commanders can deliver tailored guidance that accelerates the effective use of foreign aid. Integrating red‑team assessments and expanding the range of less‑detailed options equips advisory staffs to adapt as situations evolve, a necessity in fluid conflicts such as Ukraine’s. These insights are already influencing NATO’s donor coordination frameworks and will likely shape revisions to U.S. joint planning doctrine, ensuring that advisory commands remain agile and impactful in multi‑actor theaters.