Why It Matters
The stalemate directly shapes regional security, U.S. diplomatic credibility, and the multi‑billion‑dollar reconstruction effort required for Gaza’s future.
Key Takeaways
- •Major Gaza fighting ended, but cease‑fire remains fragile
- •92% of Gaza housing destroyed; reconstruction will cost billions
- •Rafah crossing reopened, but traffic limited to pedestrians
- •Trump’s peace plan faces stalemate without Hamas demilitarization
- •Netanyahu and Hamas hold irreconcilable goals, hindering governance
Pulse Analysis
The cessation of large‑scale combat in Gaza marks a turning point, but the humanitarian picture remains bleak. The World Food Programme reports a modest rise to two meals per day, and markets have seen a trickle of vegetables and eggs. Yet 92 percent of homes lie in ruins, generating roughly 50 million metric tons of rubble and overwhelming health facilities, which struggle with water, sanitation, and disease outbreaks. These conditions underscore the urgent need for massive reconstruction funding and coordinated aid delivery.
Politically, the landscape is dominated by an intractable impasse. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is focused on securing reelection in 2026, preserving his right‑wing coalition, and avoiding concessions that could empower the Palestinian Authority. Hamas, meanwhile, seeks to retain its governance role in Gaza and expand influence on the West Bank. The Trump administration’s 20‑point plan has made incremental progress—most notably the limited reopening of the Rafah crossing—but without Hamas agreeing to demilitarization, the technical committee and any prospective international stabilization force remain ineffective. The upcoming White House Board of Peace meeting is unlikely to bridge these gaps.
The broader implications extend beyond Gaza’s borders. Reconstruction will require billions of dollars and decades to clear debris, a task that could strain donor fatigue and test U.S. foreign‑policy leverage. Persistent volatility risks reigniting hostilities, destabilizing neighboring Egypt and Jordan, and complicating broader Middle‑East peace initiatives. A coordinated international effort, anchored by realistic security arrangements and robust governance structures, is essential to prevent a protracted humanitarian crisis and to restore a semblance of stability to the region.
Challenges Overshadow Hope in Gaza
Major fighting has ended, but irreconcilable positions will bedevil Trump’s peace plan. · By Aaron David Miller, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lauren Morganbesser, fellow at The Cohen Group · February 10, 2026, 8:09 AM
Caption: A Palestinian man sleeps next to his horse in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on Feb. 10. Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images
Whether or not they’re prepared to admit it, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump will be forced to conclude that the current and future prospects for Gaza are bleak when they meet at the White House this week. While the horrors of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack and the ferocious war that Israel waged in response are probably over, the sheer recalcitrance of both Hamas and Israel ensures that demilitarization and successful governance are unlikely to be realized. Focused U.S. leadership might improve matters. But as we look ahead into 2026, chances are Gaza will remain divided, dysfunctional, and sporadically violent.
The good news is that the large‑scale war we have watched for two years has ended and is unlikely to resume. Pressure from the Trump administration, Israel’s failure to accomplish its military goals, election‑year politics, and the exhaustion and dislocation caused by the extended deployment of reservists has diminished that possibility. Still, there are credible reports that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has plans for a major operation to destroy Hamas in the roughly half of Gaza under its control, and we cannot rule it out.
With major fighting subsiding, the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has improved. But improvement is relative, and too many Palestinians continue to be deprived of essential aid, particularly proper shelter and adequate access to medical care. The cease‑fire has brought changes: according to the World Food Programme, Gazan households averaged two meals per day in January compared to just one last July. Commercial goods, including vegetables, chicken, and eggs, have reappeared in Gaza’s markets. Humanitarian agencies have repaired roads, rehabilitated hospitals, cleared rubble, and reopened aid distribution points.
But there is still significant work to be done: most Gazans are living in tents and makeshift homes as 92 percent of all residential buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed, resulting in nearly 50 million metric tons of rubble that will take decades and billions of dollars to clear. Health care and basic public services are in shambles, causing outbreaks of disease fueled by the destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure. Limited access to humanitarian aid, including medicine, makes this a difficult situation to remedy, particularly as Israel continues to ban aid organizations from operating in Gaza.
Slowly, progress has been made to complete the first phase of Trump’s 20‑point peace plan. Gaza’s Rafah border crossing with Egypt recently reopened after being closed for 20 months, though traffic both in and out of the enclave is highly restricted and, for now, confined to pedestrian traffic. Only a few Palestinians have received clearance to pass through the crossing, but the reopening could allow thousands of sick and wounded Gazans to access treatment abroad.
Against this backdrop, several factors stand out that diminish the odds of straight‑line progress to better governance, security, and prosperity.
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Most significantly, the remit of the technical committee created to run Gaza will be limited until Hamas agrees to demilitarization. Reports indicate Egypt has begun to fashion concepts of such a process; however, a Hamas official has stated the group never agreed to such a process, underscoring how heavy the lift will be. An international stabilization force (ISF) remains a thought experiment without contributors, a mandate, funding, or a timetable, and it is unlikely to deploy without Hamas’s acquiescence.
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The Palestinians appear to be an appendage in the Trump administration’s Gaza planning. Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas are rejected by either the United States or Israel, and Palestinian elections cannot be held soon. The fallback appears to be a committee of respected Gazans to organize administration, subordinated to an executive board of powerful Arabs, Americans, and international figures, which in turn is subordinated to the Board of Peace chaired by Trump, who has veto power over all proposals.
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The White House is reportedly planning a Board of Peace meeting on Feb. 19. While the meeting might raise money from Trump’s friends, it is unlikely to solve Gaza’s troubles. Netanyahu moved his visit to Washington up a week, possibly for crunch‑time negotiations on Iran or to avoid a political disaster at home.
It may be politically inconvenient to admit, but the main reason the best‑intentioned plans—and the three cease‑fires since Oct. 7—have cratered is because of the mutually irreconcilable visions that the current Israeli government and the Hamas leadership hold for Gaza and the broader Israeli‑Palestinian conflict. Pressure could be brought to bear to successfully implement phase one. But the challenges of phase two—demilitarization, governance, and reconstruction—cut to the core of their respective futures and are existential for Hamas and politically existential for Netanyahu.
Hamas wants to survive the war as an organization, remain the preeminent political and security actor in Gaza, expand its influence on the West Bank, and assume the dominant position within the Palestinian national movement. Netanyahu’s survival agenda includes winning reelection in 2026, keeping his right‑wing coalition together, avoiding concessions on Gaza that would empower the Palestinian Authority, refusing any path to a Palestinian state, and keeping Trump in his corner. No mediator has been able to bridge that gap, and under current circumstances, none will.
Hollowed‑out as a military organization, Hamas has survived Oct. 7 and, according to the IDF, is already resurging politically. Indeed, two years after Oct. 7, the Israel‑Hamas fight continues to pose serious challenges to Israelis and Palestinians alike.
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations. He is the author of The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President. X: @aarondmiller2
Lauren Morganbesser is a fellow at The Cohen Group. The views expressed in this article are her own. X: @LMorganbesser
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