Indonesia, Australia Sign Security Treaty, Pledge Joint Consultations

Why It Matters

The treaty deepens Indo‑Pacific security cooperation, nudging the regional balance amid China’s growing influence while preserving Indonesia’s non‑aligned foreign policy. It offers a framework for coordinated action without obligating either side to automatic military support.

Key Takeaways

• Treaty mandates regular security consultations between Jakarta and Canberra.
• Agreement expands military education exchanges and joint training facilities.
• Not a mutual defence pact; remains consultative framework.
• Reflects shared concerns over China’s regional assertiveness.
• Indonesia maintains non‑aligned stance, balancing ties with major powers.

Pulse Analysis

The Jakarta‑signed Treaty on Common Security marks the most formalized security arrangement between Indonesia and Australia since the 1995 pact that fell apart after the East Timor crisis. By reviving the consultative language of earlier agreements, both governments aim to institutionalize dialogue on maritime security, counter‑terrorism, and cyber threats. This diplomatic choreography underscores a broader shift in Canberra’s strategy to embed itself more deeply within Southeast Asian security architectures, while Jakarta seeks to leverage the partnership to enhance its own defence capabilities.

Strategically, the treaty arrives at a time when China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea and broader Indo‑Pacific has prompted regional actors to reassess their security postures. Although the agreement stops short of a binding mutual‑defence clause, its emphasis on joint consultations and potential coordinated measures signals a convergence of interests. Indonesia’s continued adherence to a non‑aligned doctrine means it will balance this cooperation with ongoing engagements with Beijing and Moscow, making the treaty a nuanced tool rather than a hard security guarantee.

On the operational front, the deal unlocks concrete steps: expanded military‑education exchanges, a senior Indonesian officer embedded in the Australian Defence Force, and joint training facilities in Indonesia. These initiatives aim to build interoperability and trust, reducing the risk of misperception during crises. Analysts caution that the treaty’s impact will hinge on measurable follow‑through, but its symbolic weight and practical components together lay a foundation for a more coordinated Indo‑Pacific security environment.

Indonesia, Australia Sign Security Treaty, Pledge Joint Consultations

By Sebastian Strangio · February 10, 2026

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto shakes hands with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese during a joint press conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, Feb. 6, 2026. Credit: X/Anthony Albanese

On Friday, Indonesia and Australia signed a security treaty that commits them to increased security consultations and joint consultations over emergent shared threats. The Treaty on Common Security, which was first announced during Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Australia in November, was signed on Friday in Jakarta.

Speaking to the press alongside Prabowo, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said that “no country is more important to Australia or to the prosperity, security and stability of the Indo‑Pacific than Indonesia.”

“The treaty is a significant extension of our existing security and defence cooperation,” he added, according to an official transcript of his comments. “It demonstrates the strength of our partnership and depth of our trust and cooperation.” The trip was Albanese’s fifth to Indonesia since taking office in 2022, and the second since Prabowo took office in October 2024.

Prabowo said similarly that the pact, which Albanese also referred to as the “Jakarta Treaty,” was a sign of the positive momentum in the relationship between Canberra and Jakarta. “To Indonesia, this reflects our full commitment to the good neighbour principles and our free and active foreign policy,” he said, as reported by Reuters.

The treaty was reportedly first discussed between Albanese and Prabowo shortly after Australia’s federal election last May, and was negotiated in secret over the subsequent months. While hosting Prabowo in Canberra in November, the Australian leader described it as a “watershed moment” that “signals a new era in the Australia‑Indonesia relationship.”

The agreement, which builds on the Lombok Treaty of 1996 and the Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2024, is mostly based on the 1995 security agreement signed by then‑Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and Indonesian President Suharto. That earlier pact was in effect until 1999, when Indonesia pulled out due to Australia’s involvement in the East Timor crisis.

As in the 1995 agreement, the ABC reported on Friday that the new security treaty states that both countries will consult regularly about “matters affecting their common security” and pursue “mutually beneficial” security cooperation. The document also says both countries will “consult” if either faces “adverse challenges” to their common security interests and, “if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly” in response.

However, while the agreement has clear symbolic importance, unlike the Pukpuk Treaty that Australia signed with Papua New Guinea last year, it stops short of being a full‑blown mutual defence pact. A report from the Sydney Morning Herald quoted one Indonesian official as saying that Australia was keen to use the word “treaty” to make the agreement “more eye‑catching.”

Analysts from both nations emphasized that while Indonesia shares some Australian concerns about China, it also continues to adhere to a non‑aligned foreign‑policy doctrine that emphasizes sustained defence engagements with all major powers, including China and Russia.

As Susannah Patton of Sydney’s Lowy Institute told the ABC last week, “the idea that Australia and Indonesia agree on the regional security outlook and what they would do in response to some kind of crisis, is just not accurate.”

Hangga Fathana of Universitas Islam Indonesia also expressed skepticism about the agreement, arguing that while a consultative treaty “may reduce misperception… it can also become a respectable way to delay hard decisions.” He added, “If this agreement is to be more than placebo, it will need follow‑through that is visible and measurable. The text alone does not supply it.”

While in Jakarta, Albanese also announced a number of complementary initiatives, including the expansion of military‑education exchanges between the two nations and the establishment of a “new embedded position” for a senior Indonesian officer in the Australian Defence Force. He also said that Australia would support development of joint defence‑training facilities in Indonesia to enhance Jakarta’s ability to conduct joint exercises with partners including Australia.