China’s nuclear buildup threatens to erode U.S. deterrence credibility and could spark a new arms race, compelling Washington to adapt its security strategy. The issue is central to regional stability and global non‑proliferation efforts.
China’s nuclear program has entered a phase of accelerated growth, marked by a series of underground tests and the deployment of advanced delivery systems. Analysts estimate that Beijing now possesses several hundred warheads, a figure that could double within the next decade. This expansion reflects a strategic shift from a minimal deterrent to a more credible second‑strike capability, altering the long‑standing nuclear equilibrium that has underpinned global security since the Cold War. The move also signals Beijing’s intent to assert greater influence over regional disputes, from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea.
For the United States, China’s expanding arsenal poses a multifaceted challenge. Existing deterrence doctrines, calibrated for a relatively modest Chinese force, may no longer suffice to assure allies and deter aggression. Kroenig argues that the U.S. must modernize its nuclear triad—upgrading submarine platforms, developing low‑yield options, and enhancing missile defense—to maintain credible deterrence. Simultaneously, policymakers need to strengthen alliances, particularly with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, ensuring a coordinated response that balances deterrence with diplomatic engagement. Failure to adapt could embolden adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation.
The broader implications extend to the global non‑proliferation regime. As China’s capabilities grow, momentum for arms‑control negotiations stalls, reducing avenues for transparency and confidence‑building. This environment heightens the probability of regional actors pursuing their own nuclear options, further complicating strategic stability. Experts suggest that renewed dialogue—potentially under the framework of a U.S.–China strategic stability pact—could mitigate escalation risks. However, such efforts require political will and a clear articulation of mutual security interests, lest the world slip back into a competitive nuclear buildup reminiscent of the early Cold War era.
On February 9, Atlantic Council vice president andScowcroft Centersenior directorMatthew Kroenigwasinterviewed on the School of War podcast about China’s nuclear arsenal and impacts on US national security.
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Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Related Experts: Matthew Kroenig
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