Lessons From Iran: Could Pakistan Emulate Iran’s Ballistic Missile Strategy?

Why It Matters

Pakistan’s ability to mass‑produce and effectively employ modern ballistic missiles could alter the strategic balance with India and affect regional stability, while U.S. sanctions aim to curb that capability.

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s BM launch rate fell 90% after strikes.
• Pakistan’s Fatah-2 mirrors Iran’s Fateh‑110 core design.
• US sanctions target Pakistan’s solid‑fuel missile supply chain.
• Pakistan’s Rocket Force Command emulates IRGC’s decentralized model.
• Mass‑production capability remains Pakistan’s biggest hurdle.

Pulse Analysis

Iran’s missile strategy has been a double‑edged sword. By flooding the battlefield with thousands of rockets and loitering munitions, Tehran forced its adversaries to allocate costly interceptors, creating a favorable cost‑exchange ratio. Yet the rapid decline in launch frequency—down 90% after coalition strikes on stockpiles—reveals the fragility of a doctrine that substitutes missiles for a crippled air force. The strategic messaging succeeded, but the tactical payoff lagged behind what conventional air power could achieve.

Pakistan is now walking a parallel path, leveraging the Fatah‑2 as a versatile core platform that can be stretched into the Abdali strategic variant and the SMASH anti‑ship missile. This mirrors Iran’s Fateh‑110 evolution, where a single solid‑fuel rocket gave rise to a family of longer‑range, multi‑role weapons. However, Pakistan lacks Iran’s extensive casting pits, composite‑casing expertise, and filament‑winding infrastructure. U.S. sanctions imposed in late 2024 on key suppliers of composite materials and motor‑test equipment directly target these gaps, aiming to stall the transition from prototype to mass production.

The broader implication for South Asian security hinges on how Pakistan integrates its new missiles into operational doctrine. The establishment of the Army Rocket Force Command suggests a move toward a more decentralized, rapid‑response model akin to the IRGC’s “mosaic” structure, but institutional preferences still favor centralised control. If Pakistan can overcome industrial bottlenecks, it may employ ballistic missiles tactically—targeting logistics hubs, bridges, and air‑defence nodes—to complement air strikes, echoing Ukraine’s HIMARS use. Conversely, without scalable production and a clear employment framework, the missiles will remain a strategic signal rather than a decisive battlefield tool.