The Economics of War: The West Must Embrace Mass Production of Weapons

Why It Matters

The inability to counter cheap drone swarms economically erodes deterrence and raises operational costs for NATO allies. Accelerating production of affordable interceptors like Piorun can preserve combat effectiveness while containing defence budgets.

Key Takeaways

• Drone swarms exceed 54,000 units annually in Ukraine.
• Western SAM missiles cost millions, production lead times 2‑3 years.
• Poland’s Piorun MANPADS produces ~1,400 missiles per year.
• Low‑cost interceptors can engage drones, cruise missiles, ballistic threats.
• Industry must pivot to mass‑manufacturable, affordable air‑defence systems.

Pulse Analysis

The rapid proliferation of inexpensive unmanned aerial systems has reshaped modern battlefields. In Ukraine alone, more than 54,000 hostile drones were recorded in 2025, overwhelming traditional air‑defence concepts that were designed for manned aircraft and a limited number of cruise missiles. This shift toward "mass‑technological" warfare forces militaries to reconsider how they allocate resources, emphasizing quantity and cost‑effectiveness over singular high‑performance platforms.

High‑end surface‑to‑air missiles such as Patriot, SAMP/T, and NASAMS remain essential for strategic threats, yet each round can cost millions and requires two to three years to manufacture. Their limited production runs cannot saturate the sky against swarms of cheap drones. By contrast, Poland’s Piorun MANPADS demonstrates a viable alternative: a lightweight, missile‑based system that costs an order of magnitude less while still engaging drones, cruise missiles, and even some ballistic targets. With an annual output of roughly 1,300‑1,400 missiles and growing export interest from Sweden, Belgium, and other NATO members, Piorun illustrates how domestic, low‑cost solutions can be rapidly fielded.

For Western defence industries, the imperative is clear: reorient supply chains toward modular, high‑volume production lines that deliver affordable interceptors at scale. Policymakers should incentivize R&D in cheap counter‑UAS technologies, streamline procurement processes, and support allied manufacturers capable of meeting surge demands. Doing so will not only bolster collective security in regions like Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf but also preserve fiscal sustainability as conflicts extend beyond the initial kinetic phase.