
US Unlikely to Convince China to Join New Nuclear Arms Control Agreement, Experts Say
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Why It Matters
Without a trilateral pact, the absence of formal limits heightens the risk of an unchecked nuclear arms race, threatening global security and complicating diplomatic efforts to manage great‑power competition.
Key Takeaways
- •New START expired February 2026, no US‑Russia extension
- •US seeks trilateral pact with China, Russia
- •Chinese leadership shows little interest in immediate talks
- •Upcoming leaders’ meetings unlikely to shift stance
- •Arms control gap raises global proliferation concerns
Pulse Analysis
The lapse of the New START treaty marks a pivotal moment in post‑Cold War arms control. For over two decades, New START capped the number of deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, providing a transparent verification regime that helped stabilize US‑Russia relations. Its expiration leaves both nations free to expand arsenals, prompting Washington to explore new frameworks that can re‑impose limits and restore confidence. The timing coincides with heightened geopolitical friction, making the absence of a bilateral deal a glaring vulnerability in the global non‑proliferation architecture.
Washington’s strategy now hinges on coaxing China into a three‑way agreement, a move that reflects the Pentagon’s assessment that Beijing’s growing nuclear modernization cannot be ignored. However, Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized a policy of strategic restraint and have signaled that any multilateral treaty must align with their national security interests, which currently prioritize deterrence over disarmament. The United States also faces domestic political pressures and skepticism from allies who question whether a trilateral pact could be negotiated without compromising existing US‑Russia arms‑control objectives.
The broader implication is a potential proliferation vacuum that could embolden other states to pursue nuclear capabilities, eroding the normative barriers established since the 1968 Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty. In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, diplomatic channels, confidence‑building measures, and regional security dialogues become even more critical. Analysts suggest that incremental steps—such as data exchanges on missile tests or limited caps on specific delivery systems—might serve as pragmatic stop‑gaps while the major powers work toward a more durable, inclusive framework.
US unlikely to convince China to join new nuclear arms control agreement, experts say
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