Why Iran Strikes May Drive Asian Nuclear Race, Hit China in the Middle East: Zhao Tong

Why It Matters

Accelerated nuclear ambitions in Iran and China could destabilize regional security and revive an arms race, challenging the fragile non‑proliferation regime.

Key Takeaways

• US‑Israel strikes risk accelerating Iran's nuclear push
• China may expand nuclear arsenal amid perceived US aggression
• Trump’s actions could spur broader nuclear proliferation in Asia
• New START expiry heightens great‑power nuclear competition
• Hypersonic missile development shifts focus to conventional deterrence

Pulse Analysis

The fallout from the US‑Israel operation against Iran underscores a broader shift in strategic thinking among states that feel abandoned by the traditional security architecture. When the United States bypasses multilateral approvals and targets sovereign leaders, it sends a signal that material power, not diplomatic norms, will safeguard regime survival. Smaller regional actors, fearing similar coercion, may turn to indigenous nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, while allies contemplate deeper security ties with Washington despite doubts about its reliability. This environment fuels a proliferation incentive loop that could see Iran, and potentially other Middle Eastern states, fast‑tracking enrichment programs.

In Asia, the perception of an increasingly anarchic world is prompting Beijing to double down on its nuclear modernization agenda. Zhao Tong notes that China’s 15th five‑year plan, coupled with expanding facilities at Lop Nur, reflects a strategic calculus that a credible nuclear deterrent is essential amid U.S. pressure and the erosion of the rules‑based order. The expiration of the New START treaty removes a key constraint on U.S. and Russian arsenals, further encouraging China to pursue quantitative and qualitative upgrades, including low‑yield warheads and advanced delivery systems. These moves raise the specter of a new nuclear competition focused on the Indo‑Pacific, where conventional superiority is also contested through hypersonic missiles and other cutting‑edge weapons.

The convergence of U.S. unilateralism, the New START lapse, and China’s accelerated weapons development threatens to undermine decades of arms‑control progress. Non‑proliferation forums risk losing relevance as states prioritize self‑help strategies, and the global norm against nuclear testing may erode if major powers resume low‑yield experiments. Policymakers must therefore re‑evaluate engagement frameworks that address both nuclear and conventional deterrence, reinforcing multilateral mechanisms while acknowledging the shifting security landscape that now places greater emphasis on material capabilities over institutional guarantees.