Why Missile Defense Now Raises the Risk of War

Why It Matters

By reshaping strategic calculations, missile defence may increase the likelihood of broader conflicts, undermining regional stability and global arms‑control frameworks.

Key Takeaways

• Missile defense can encourage offensive risk-taking.
• US deployments may lower perceived war costs for allies.
• Israel's 2025 intercept rate fell to 86%, depleting stockpiles.
• Trump's Golden Dome could trigger security dilemma with Russia, China.
• Overreliance on shields reduces civilian protection and escalates conflict.

Pulse Analysis

Missile‑defence technology has evolved from a deterrent tool into a strategic catalyst. When leaders believe their territories are shielded, they may pursue actions previously deemed too risky, as illustrated by Israel's 2025 air campaign against Iranian sites. The psychological safety net lowers the perceived cost of escalation, prompting pre‑emptive strikes that can spiral into wider wars. This shift challenges the traditional view that missile interceptors merely protect civilians and preserve peace.

The regional implications are stark. In the Middle East, the United States' deployment of Patriot and THAAD batteries under the Trump administration has reinforced the illusion of invulnerability among allies, while simultaneously eroding their own defensive reserves. Israel’s declining interception rate—from near‑perfect coverage in 2024 to 86% in 2025—has left millions of citizens exposed and strained logistics for replenishing interceptor stocks. Such degradation not only endangers civilian populations but also fuels adversaries’ confidence that a decisive strike can overwhelm weakened shields.

Globally, the prospect of a universal U.S. "Golden Dome" raises the specter of a renewed security dilemma. Rival powers, interpreting an all‑encompassing shield as a prelude to first‑strike capability, may accelerate offensive weapon development to preserve strategic parity. This dynamic echoes Cold‑War arms races, where defensive upgrades spurred counter‑measures, heightening the risk of miscalculation. Policymakers must therefore balance the immediate protective benefits of missile defence against its longer‑term destabilising potential, ensuring that security enhancements do not inadvertently sow the seeds of larger conflict.

Why Missile Defense Now Raises the Risk of War

The delusion of invulnerability tempts leaders to take risks. · By Azriel Bermant, senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague · February 9, 2026, 7:00 AM

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks in front of an illustration of his proposed Golden Dome missile‑defense system in the White House, Washington, May 20 2025. (Chip Somodevilla/​Getty Images)

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As the United States deploys anti‑missile batteries to the Middle East as part of its force buildup in the region, the idea that these systems are a purely defensive means to shield against attacks—and thereby deter an adversary from attacking in the first place—is looking increasingly unconvincing. Instead, the current round of conflict in the Middle East suggests the opposite: a reliable anti‑missile shield could just as well create an incentive for escalation. If policymakers believe that their state is secure behind the shield, they may calculate that their own offensive military actions carry significantly lower risk.

The purely defensive and de‑escalatory case for anti‑missile systems is easily made. Exhibit A is Ukraine, where the Kremlin’s perception of Ukraine’s vulnerability—including its lack of missile defense—incentivised Russia to attack in 2022. Between February and May that year, Moscow fired more than 2,000 cruise and ballistic missiles at Ukrainian military installations, infrastructure, and population centres in an attempt to clear the way for taking over the country. Had Ukraine been able to deploy large numbers of sophisticated anti‑missile systems, the Russian leadership may have calculated the risks of an invasion very differently.

In the Middle East, too, the logic of missile defence has long been defensive and de‑escalatory. When Hamas launched a series of rocket attacks against Israeli population centres in 2012, the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome removed the need for Israel to launch a costly and bloody ground offensive into Gaza. Whether in Israel or Ukraine, even a partially successful missile defence has great value in strengthening public morale and degrading the missile threat posed by adversaries.

Indeed, by devaluing Iran’s missile threat, Israel’s air defences have contributed to the weakening of the regime in Tehran. In funding Israel’s Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems, Washington’s objective was not just to support a key ally but also to make war less likely by degrading the ability of Israel’s adversaries to attack.

Iran’s strikes on Israel in April 2024 also reinforce this argument. With 99 percent of the approximately 320 Iranian missiles and drones intercepted by Israel’s missile‑defence systems, as well as U.S., British, French, and Jordanian forces, the Biden administration viewed this success as a reason for self‑restraint. “Take the win,” then‑U.S. President Joe Biden reportedly advised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, referring to Israel’s killing of a number of senior generals in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus, which had preceded the unsuccessful Iranian missile attack.

Today that defensive logic has been turned on its head. Under the Trump administration, missile defence seems not so much a tool to lower tensions but a shorter fuse to war. Rather than disincentivising the use of force, the psychological reassurance provided by missile and drone defence may increase the temptation to take calculated risks.

This new calculus clearly shaped Israel’s decision to launch air attacks against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic‑missile programmes last June. Iran’s vulnerability to aerial attacks following Israel’s destruction of its Russian‑supplied air defences strengthened Netanyahu’s resolve to strike. At the same time, Israeli confidence in the effectiveness of its own missile and drone shield fortified its belief that it could absorb the inevitable Iranian retaliatory strikes with manageable civilian casualties.

What the new offensive logic of missile defence ignores, however, is the increased vulnerability caused by over‑reliance on missile shields. Israel’s shield was far less successful in 2025 than in 2024. According to the Israel Defence Forces, air defences intercepted 86 percent of the Iranian missiles during the 12‑day war. At least 33 Israelis were killed and more than 3,500 were wounded. The brief conflict also left Israel’s stock of missile interceptors severely depleted. In December, former Israeli National Security Council head Eyal Hulata warned that Israel’s defensive capabilities will struggle to keep pace with Iran’s missile production. Nearly one‑third of Israelis still lack adequate protection against missile attacks.

Even as the Trump administration rushes Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) batteries to the region, it is operating under the dangerous illusion that its allies are now missile‑proof. In reality, an Iranian regime with its back to the wall—and capable of extreme brutality, as we have recently seen—will have every reason to try and overwhelm the defences of its adversaries, especially if it senses that the Israeli missile shield is vulnerable. As we saw in the 12‑day war, Iran did not hesitate in attacking Israeli population centres. Were it to succeed in causing large‑scale civilian casualties in a future confrontation, the prospect of further dangerous escalation would be palpable.

The potentially destabilising effects of missile defence are not restricted to the Middle East. U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambitions for a “Golden Dome” to protect the U.S. homeland risk undermining the fragile nuclear balance with Russia and China. By openly planning a universal defence against all threats—not just rogue actors like Iran and North Korea—Trump is triggering a classic security dilemma, whereby the actions taken by one state to strengthen its own security are seen by its adversary as a threat, regardless of the first state’s intent. By merely increasing its own chances of survival, the security‑dilemma theory posits, a state will invariably threaten the survival of its rival.

U.S. adversaries now fear the worst, viewing a shield against all threats as a potential prelude to a first strike. Thus, the shield will induce them to strengthen their own offensive capabilities to break through. At the height of the Cold War, each superpower’s fear that its rival would enjoy nuclear superiority prompted a dangerous arms race.

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Azriel Bermant is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague and a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.