Can Trump Pull Out of NATO?

The episode opens by highlighting a long‑standing constitutional gap: the U.S. Constitution details treaty formation but is silent on termination. Scholars note that for roughly a century presidents have acted alone to exit low‑profile agreements, relying on treaty‑specific exit clauses when they exist. This historical pattern, reinforced by Supreme Court decisions that lean on practice in foreign‑affairs cases, forms the backbone of the argument that a president could, in theory, pull the United States out of NATO without explicit congressional consent.

NATO’s Article 13 explicitly permits any member to denounce the alliance after a one‑year notice, a provision that many assume grants the president unilateral authority. However, Congress enacted a 2023 law—passed 87‑13 in the Senate—explicitly barring the president from suspending, terminating, denouncing, or withdrawing from the North Atlantic Treaty without a two‑thirds Senate vote or another act of Congress. This statutory barrier directly challenges the century‑old practice, placing a clear legal hurdle before any executive attempt to exit the alliance and signaling bipartisan concern over the strategic and economic fallout of a sudden withdrawal.

The discussion turns to judicial interpretation. While some academics invoke the vesting clause of Article II to argue for an inherent executive power to terminate treaties, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected that expansive reading, with only Justice Thomas offering dissenting support. Courts typically weigh historical practice heavily when constitutional text is ambiguous, as seen in the Zivotofsky recognition case. Recent Office of Legal Counsel opinions illustrate the tension between executive claims of exclusive authority and congressional statutes, suggesting that any attempt by a future president to ignore the 2023 law would face a steep judicial hurdle, especially under the Youngstown framework that favors checks on unilateral executive action.