"Stalking-Type Behavior"/"Coercive Control" Of Minor Stepdaughter, or "Salutary" "Parental" Behavior?

Key Takeaways

• Court found trial court misapplied coercive control definition
• Protective parental actions may not constitute domestic violence
• DVPO issuance deemed an abuse of discretion
• Statutory definitions require explicit findings of stalking, harassment
• Appeal stresses context in coercive control assessments

Summary

Washington Court of Appeals reversed a domestic‑violence protective order (DVPO) granted to minor stepdaughter Mia against her stepfather George. The appellate panel found the trial court failed to make the statutory findings required for unlawful harassment, stalking, or coercive control, and ignored the protective intent behind George’s actions. By emphasizing that the statute excludes good‑faith parental protection, the court deemed the DVPO and related weapon‑surrender order an abuse of discretion. The decision clarifies the application of Washington’s coercive‑control provisions in family‑law contexts.

Pulse Analysis

Washington’s domestic‑violence protective order (DVPO) framework hinges on precise statutory language. RCW 7.105.010 enumerates physical harm, assault, coercive control, unlawful harassment, and stalking as qualifying conduct. However, the law also carves out a narrow exemption for "protective actions taken in good faith" by a caregiver. This dual structure forces courts to balance the protective intent of parental behavior against the risk of overreaching abuse claims, a tension that surfaced in Toles v. Toles.

In the appellate decision, judges highlighted that the trial court’s findings stopped short of labeling George’s conduct as unlawful harassment or stalking, yet still imposed a two‑year DVPO. By underscoring the statutory exemption for legitimate parental intervention, the appeals panel concluded the lower court abused its discretion. The opinion stresses that context—such as a minor’s runaway status and the caregiver’s motive—must shape the analysis of coercive‑control allegations. This nuanced approach prevents routine family‑law disputes from automatically triggering criminal‑law protections.

The precedent carries weight for practitioners handling protective‑order motions in Washington and beyond. Lawyers must now articulate the protective purpose of any monitoring or restriction measures and be prepared to demonstrate that such actions fall outside the statutory definition of coercive control. Courts, in turn, will likely demand explicit findings of unlawful harassment or stalking before issuing a DVPO. As states grapple with expanding domestic‑violence statutes, Toles v. Toles offers a cautionary example of how statutory exemptions can limit the reach of protective orders, preserving parental authority while safeguarding against genuine abuse.