Consciousness Can't Be an Illusion. Here's Why.

Why It Matters

This matters because the debate shapes how neuroscience and philosophy prioritize research: if consciousness cannot be dismissed as an illusion, the explanatory gap remains a central challenge requiring new theoretical and empirical strategies. It also highlights how personal and institutional commitments can slow conceptual progress in foundational scientific questions.

Summary

The speaker argues that labeling consciousness as an illusion is logically incoherent because any illusion presupposes an experiencing subject—so denying consciousness while invoking experience is self-contradictory. They concede that scientific accounts of consciousness might be wrong about its nature, but insist that the ‘hard problem’—explaining subjective experience—remains regardless of theoretical framing. The critic targets Daniel Dennett’s approach as ultimately evasive: Dennett seeks a way to dissolve the hard problem but has not produced a definitive solution, and may be influenced by personal investment in long-held philosophical narratives. The speaker suggests intellectual revolutions are more likely to come from younger thinkers unencumbered by such commitments.

Original Description

Is consciousness an illusion? Saying so directly contradicts experience itself. If any experience exists, the 'hard problem' remains. Dennett's search for a solution might be a walk in a hall of mirrors, driven by ego and commitment to a narrative, making true revolutions rare. #Consciousness #Philosophy #HardProblem #Psychology #Debate Full podcast with Bernardo Kastrup: https://youtu.be/lAB21FAXCDE