What Happens to the Internet when War Breaks Out? #ukraine #internet #BGP

Why It Matters

Understanding the war‑induced re‑routing of Internet traffic highlights vulnerabilities in global connectivity and informs policymakers and operators about the resilience challenges facing critical digital infrastructure during conflicts.

Key Takeaways

• AS country codes swapped frequently between Russia and Ukraine during war
• Foreign autonomous systems sharply declined in Russian infrastructure after 2021
• Ukrainian ISP disconnections spiked pre‑invasion, mostly Russian‑owned ASes
• Peerings with Ukrainian networks tripled, while Russian foreign peers fell
• Validation using traceroutes and PTR records achieved ~75% accuracy

Summary

The video presents a research project examining how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshaped Internet inter‑peering and autonomous system (AS) dynamics from April 2021 through early 2025. Using data from regional registries, PeeringDB, Packet Clearing House, Hurricane Electric, and quarterly snapshots from KADA, the authors track AS registrations, country‑code changes, and peering relationships across both nations.

Key findings include a notable drop in the total number of ASes registered to each country, with a surge of ASes flipping their country code between Russia and Ukraine between October 2022 and April 2023. Foreign AS presence in Russian facilities fell steadily, while Ukrainian infrastructure saw pre‑invasion spikes in disconnections—45 ASes in late 2021, 54 in early 2021—most of which were Russian‑owned ISPs. Conversely, Ukrainian ASes experienced disconnections just before the February 2022 invasion, largely affecting Russian‑controlled networks.

To validate the raw datasets, the team cross‑checked traceroute records from RIPE Atlas and performed PTR‑record matching for Ukrainian IXPs. This effort confirmed the offline status of a small, bomb‑damaged exchange in Mariupol and yielded an overall validation accuracy of roughly 75 %. The analysis also revealed that foreign peerings to Ukrainian ASes tripled after October 2022, while Russian foreign peers and client relationships declined markedly.

The study concludes that peering activity shifted months before the full‑scale invasion, with significant infrastructure loss in eastern Ukraine and a lasting reconfiguration of cross‑border Internet connectivity. These dynamics underscore how geopolitical conflict can rapidly alter the technical fabric of global networks.

Original Description

How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Changed Internet Peering?

This presentation explores how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshaped Internet peering between the two countries, including changes in AS activity, IXPs, and inter-network relationships. It shows that connectivity shifts began even before the full-scale invasion and continued to affect regional Internet infrastructure afterward.

04:27 Surge in Number of ASes that Change Country

05:30 Joins and Disconnections of Non-Russian ASes in Russian Infrastructure

12:26 Ukrainian IXPs Matched with IPs for Each Timestamp

#InternetPeering #BGP #IXP #NetworkMeasurement #Ukraine