New Video Shows Ukrainian F-16 Scoring Gun Kill on Russian Drone
•February 9, 2026
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Why It Matters
The success demonstrates a cost‑effective method for countering swarms of inexpensive drones, preserving scarce missile stocks while bolstering Ukraine’s air‑defence capability. It also underscores the operational trade‑offs of exposing high‑value fighters to heightened low‑altitude danger.
Key Takeaways
- •F‑16 uses M61 cannon to down Shahed drone
- •Gun intercepts cost far less than missile launches
- •Ukraine revives anti‑aircraft guns for low‑cost drone defense
- •Low‑altitude gun fights increase pilot risk versus missiles
- •Ukrainian air force logged >1,000 UAV/ missile kills Jan‑2026
Pulse Analysis
The Shahed‑136, rebranded by Russia as the Geran‑2, has become a staple of its aerial campaign in Ukraine since late 2022. Weighing roughly 200 kg and capable of loitering for hours, the cheap, one‑way UAV can be produced in the thousands, overwhelming traditional surface‑to‑air missile (SAM) defenses. Each drone costs a fraction of a modern air‑to‑air missile, forcing defenders to expend expensive interceptors on low‑value targets. This asymmetry has driven Kyiv to explore alternative, low‑cost kill methods, including gunfire from both ground and airborne platforms.
Gun‑based solutions have re‑emerged as a pragmatic answer. Ukrainian forces have fielded legacy DShK heavy machine guns, refurbished Gepard anti‑aircraft guns, and portable search‑light systems to illuminate and engage Shahed swarms. The most striking example is the F‑16’s M61 Vulcan cannon, capable of firing up to 6,000 rounds per minute of 20 mm ammunition, delivering a kinetic kill without depleting missile inventories. Similar tactics are employed by civilian‑converted aircraft such as the Antonov An‑28, whose crew‑served miniguns have reportedly downed around 150 drones, proving the versatility of gun platforms across the spectrum.
While economically attractive, gun engagements impose new operational risks. Pilots must close to low altitude, aligning the jet’s nose with a slow‑moving target, exposing themselves to ground fire and increasing the chance of collateral damage from stray rounds. The balance between preserving missile stockpiles and protecting high‑value assets will shape Ukraine’s air‑defence doctrine in the months ahead. Successes like the recent F‑16 kill signal that kinetic air‑defence can be a viable component of layered protection, prompting other nations facing drone swarms to reassess the role of legacy anti‑aircraft artillery in modern combat.
New Video Shows Ukrainian F-16 Scoring Gun Kill on Russian Drone
A Geran‑2 (Shahed 136) attack drone is seen exploding in mid‑air shortly before an F‑16 soars overhead, with the unmistakable sound of an M61 Vulcan cannon heard in the background.
This is at least the second time such a kill has been captured on video, though this new footage – first posted on Telegram – is the most clear that we’ve had so far. The Iranian‑designed one‑way attack drone flies almost directly overhead the person filming the video and then is suddenly engulfed in a huge explosion several times the size of the aircraft. An F‑16, said to be one of those operated by the 107th Separate Aviation Wing of the Ukrainian Air Force, follows shortly after, pulling up and away from the explosion as the delayed sound of the aircraft’s rotary cannon reaches the camera.
“An F‑16 fighter jet operated by the Ukrainian Air Force intercepts a Russian Shahed/Geran‑type long‑range OWA‑UAV with its M61A1 Vulcan 20 mm auto‑cannon.”
— Status‑6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able), February 8 2026
Celebrations can be heard from those on the ground as bits of debris from the drone tumble through the air, apparently into a wooded area. Russia has employed the Shahed 136, which it designates Geran‑2, extensively during its invasion of Ukraine; they first appeared in the second half of 2022. They have been used to attack critical infrastructure, military facilities, and civilian buildings. Modifications have even seen the 200‑kilogram drones outfitted with anti‑aircraft missiles.
Countering Drones
Relatively low cost compared to more advanced and much faster guided missiles, one‑way attack drones are designed to be used in large numbers either over time or simultaneously, causing rapid depletion in an adversary’s anti‑aircraft munition stockpiles. The cost of an intercepting missile far outweighs the cost of the comparatively simple drone, so intercepts using gun ammunition are far more preferable whenever possible.
Anti‑aircraft guns have seen a resurgence after many nations wrote them off in favor of surface‑to‑air missiles (SAMs). Ukraine employs DShK machine guns in tandem with searchlights in a tactic reminiscent of World War II. More advanced developments involve thermal‑imaging sights or infrared searchlights. Modern, larger‑caliber anti‑aircraft guns like the German Gepard, developed in the 1960s, have also made their way into Ukraine’s inventory.
“Ukrainian TDF forces in the north test out a portable antiaircraft searchlight system, primarily aimed at spotting smaller loitering munitions like the Shahed‑136.”
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical), March 11 2023
Helicopters and fixed‑wing aircraft have also used their guns to tackle the drone threat. This includes crew‑served door guns as well as the nose‑mounted turrets of Mi‑24 Hind attack helicopters. Piston‑engined Yak‑52 training aircraft have been called into service, with the rear crew member using a handheld weapon to shoot down drones much like in an early First World War dogfight. Recent footage shot by a French news crew showed the level of success attained by an Antonov An‑28 with crew‑served M134 miniguns, scoring over 150 drone kills.
“French channel TF1 shows an An‑28 passenger plane, armed with miniguns, shooting down Shahed drones over Ukraine. The aircraft’s crew, consisting of civilian volunteers, has shot down nearly 150 UAVs in total.”
— WarTranslated (@wartranslated), February 5 2026
The M61 Vulcan
The M134 is effectively a scaled‑down version of the M61 Vulcan used by the F‑16 to down the Russian drone. Rather than the 7.62 mm ammunition used by the minigun, the aircraft cannon fires 20 mm rounds at a rate of up to 6 000 per minute. The M61 first saw combat use in 1965 and has been in frontline service continuously since that date, fitted to aircraft as diverse as the F‑104 Starfighter and the F‑22 Raptor. It also appears on the iconic Phalanx close‑in weapons system (CIWS) carried by many warships and adapted into shore‑based air‑defence systems.
Although gun kills are far more preferable from an economic and logistics standpoint—saving more expensive and less expendable weapons for sophisticated threats—they force fighter crews into engagements at very low level against comparatively slow‑moving targets. This presents a higher level of risk than stand‑off missile launches; if successful, gun kills are highly effective, but mistakes could quickly cause the loss of both the aircraft and its highly trained pilot.
Platforms like the An‑28 mitigate this by making the weapon trainable—the aircraft can fly straight and level while the crew aims at the target. For an F‑16, the pilot must point the nose of the jet at the target while also factoring in the high risk of collateral damage. If an attack is carried out from the same altitude or below, stray 20 mm rounds could unintentionally cause severe damage on the ground and threaten civilian lives. Ideally, an attack is made from above, heading toward the ground, ensuring stray rounds impact harmlessly into terrain.
“Footage of a Ukrainian Air Force F‑16 chasing down a Russian Kh‑101 cruise missile.”
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical), December 22 2025
It’s not known exactly how many F‑16s have so far been transferred into Ukrainian hands, though the number is sufficient to sustain daily sorties which, by January 2026, had resulted in over 1,000 aerial kills of drones and cruise missiles. At least four F‑16s have been lost, with three of these losses occurring during drone attacks. In three out of these four known cases the pilot did not survive.
More F‑16s, along with other aircraft both in the short and long term, are on the way, but the loss rate of current aircraft must be kept sustainable by delicately balancing these higher‑risk missions against the operational necessity of using these assets rather than other aircraft or ground‑based air‑defence (GBAD) systems.
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