ISS and Glass Lewis Release Compensation-Related Updates For 2026 Proxy Season

Key Takeaways

• ISS expands pay‑for‑performance window to five years
• Long‑term equity awards gain favorable qualitative assessment
• Low say‑on‑pay support considered if meaningful engagement shown
• Glass Lewis adopts six‑test scorecard, replaces A‑F grades
• High non‑employee director pay may trigger adverse recommendations

Summary

ISS and Glass Lewis have unveiled new compensation‑related voting policies for the 2026 proxy season. ISS extends its pay‑for‑performance quantitative analysis to a five‑year look‑back, gives a favorable view to long‑term time‑based equity awards, adds flexibility for companies receiving less than 70% say‑on‑pay support, and flags excessive non‑employee director pay. Glass Lewis replaces its A‑F letter‑grade system with a six‑test scorecard that aggregates to a 0‑100 rating. The updates become effective early 2026 and will shape how boards design executive pay packages.

Pulse Analysis

Proxy advisors such as ISS and Glass Lewis wield considerable influence over executive compensation decisions, especially during the annual proxy season. ISS’s shift to a five‑year pay‑for‑performance horizon signals a move toward evaluating sustained shareholder returns rather than short‑term spikes. By rewarding time‑based equity awards that vest over at least five years, the firm encourages companies to embed long‑term value creation into CEO contracts, while its new flexibility on low say‑on‑pay results rewards genuine shareholder outreach even when feedback is limited.

Glass Lewis’s adoption of a six‑test scorecard replaces the simplistic A‑F grading with a nuanced, data‑driven framework. The tests examine CEO and executive pay against total shareholder return, financial performance, short‑term incentives, and qualitative factors such as one‑time awards. Companies receive a composite score from 0 to 100, allowing more granular differentiation among peers. This methodology reduces the penalty for incomplete data sets, but still pressures firms to demonstrate clear alignment between compensation and measurable outcomes, reshaping board deliberations on incentive design.

The combined effect of these policy updates will reverberate across corporate governance practices. Boards will likely revisit compensation committees’ metrics, extending equity vesting periods and tightening controls on director pay to avoid adverse proxy recommendations. Shareholder activists may leverage the new criteria to push for greater transparency and performance linkage. Early compliance not only safeguards vote outcomes but also signals a commitment to sustainable compensation philosophy, a factor increasingly valued by investors and rating agencies alike.