The Geopolitical Reading List: “We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence”

Key Takeaways

• Diffused surprise: threats lack clear source, hard to detect
• Concentrated surprise: known adversary mis‑judged capabilities
• IBM 1993 failure mirrors national intelligence lapses
• Cross‑domain framework reveals shared cognitive biases
• Broadening corporate intel beyond competition improves risk foresight

Summary

Colin Reed reviews Avner Barnea’s "We Never Expected That," which links national‑security intelligence failures with corporate competitive‑intelligence lapses. Barnea introduces a two‑part taxonomy—diffused surprise, where threats are ambiguous, and concentrated surprise, where known adversaries are mis‑read. The book applies this framework to cases such as the September 11 attacks and IBM’s 1993 near‑collapse, highlighting shared cognitive biases. Reed argues the analysis is vital as governments and firms increasingly intersect in geopolitical risk‑management.

Pulse Analysis

The line between national‑security intelligence and corporate competitive intelligence is eroding as global supply‑chain shocks, pandemics and geopolitical tensions become routine. Executives now confront "gray rhinos"—large, visible threats that arrive with warning—but many still react with surprise. Integrating state‑craft analytical tools into business risk‑management offers a way to translate early warnings into actionable strategies, ensuring that large‑scale disruptions are anticipated rather than merely endured.

Barnea’s diffused versus concentrated surprise typology provides a practical lens for dissecting these failures. Diffused surprise captures ambiguous, ambient threats—like the 1987 First Intifada—where the target is unclear, while concentrated surprise describes mis‑judgments about a known adversary, exemplified by the September 11 attacks. Applying the same lens to IBM’s 1993 market misread reveals that corporate leaders suffer the same confirmation bias, anchoring and groupthink that plague intelligence agencies. Recognizing these cognitive pathologies across domains equips decision‑makers with a diagnostic checklist for blind‑spot analysis.

For business leaders, the takeaway is clear: expand intelligence functions beyond competitor tracking to include geopolitical sensing and strategic forecasting. Building dedicated units that mirror national‑security analysis—complete with red‑team exercises and scenario planning—can surface diffused threats before they materialize. Moreover, cross‑training analysts in both arenas fosters a shared vocabulary, reducing the translation gap between government warnings and corporate action. As the geopolitical landscape grows more volatile, firms that adopt Barnea’s cross‑domain framework will be better positioned to navigate systemic shocks and protect shareholder value.