3/31/26 National Security and Korean News and Commentary
The Small Wars Journal roundup highlights a surge of opinion pieces and reports on escalating tensions in the Middle East and East Asia. Key items include debates over U.S. involvement in a potential ground war in Iran, concerns that the Iran conflict is choking helium supplies vital for AI hardware, and Japan’s reported plutonium stock sufficient for 5,500 nuclear warheads. On the Korean peninsula, UN resolutions condemn North Korea’s human‑rights record while South Korean public opinion shows growing support for reunification, especially among students. The collection underscores a volatile security environment that could reshape defense spending and geopolitical strategies.
Alibaba Sellers Offer Shahed Drone Copies for Russia Delivery Despite China’s Export Controls
Chinese sellers on Alibaba are advertising functional copies of Iran’s Shahed‑136 loitering munition, disguising them as model planes, pesticide sprayers or survey drones. Despite China’s UAV export controls that began on September 1 2025 and Alibaba’s ban on military hardware, four listings...
SOF News – Monthly Drone Report – March 2026
In March 2026, low‑cost unmanned aerial systems continued to out‑pace traditional air defenses, with drones under $50,000 striking assets worth millions. The U.S. counter‑UAS effort in the Iran conflict highlighted a shift toward electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and distributed sensor...
Video: Rubio on Objectives in Iran | Good Morning America
Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Good Morning America that the U.S. war against Iran is guided by four precise objectives: destroying Iran’s air force, navy, missile capability, and weapons‑manufacturing factories. He said the campaign is ahead of schedule and...
Review: Raising the Bar – The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art in U.S. Army...
Colonel Kevin M. Benson’s new book chronicles how the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) was founded in the early 1980s to address a doctrinal gap between tactical actions and strategic objectives. By embedding operational art into FM 100‑5, the Army...
Cargo Theft in the Transportation Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Texas and Mexico
Dr. Nathan Jones’s technical report compares cargo theft in Texas and Mexico, revealing starkly different organized‑crime tactics. In Mexico, thefts are overt and violent, while Texas criminals favor fraud, deception, and cyber‑enabled schemes. The study links Mexico’s weak state capacity...
“Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia—That’s All One War”: Ukrainian Delegation’s Remarks on Iran War
Ukrainian military officials warned that Iran has adopted Russia’s persistent, attrition‑focused drone strategy, shifting from large, episodic strikes to smaller, repeated attacks across a wider target set. Moscow is providing Iran with both hardware and targeting expertise, creating a feedback...
SOF News: Iran War Weekly Update – 28 Mar 2026
During the week of March 20‑27, the United States and Israel intensified Operation Epic Fury, striking Iranian missile launchers, naval vessels, and weapons‑production sites. While these attacks have noticeably degraded Tehran’s immediate strike capacity, Iran’s command structure remains resilient and...
Transforming Army Education: The Leadership Laboratory
Army University is overhauling military education with a “leadership laboratory” model. The new approach shifts from lecture‑based instruction to student‑centric, experiential learning that builds self‑awareness, critical thinking, team development, and change‑leadership skills. Facilitators act as guides, creating psychological safety and...
Cue, Not Confirmation: Air Sensing in Irregular Warfare
Airborne sign‑of‑life sensors can detect chemical or biological traces to infer human presence in urban and subterranean environments. The article warns that these cues are probabilistic and must not be treated as definitive identification, recommending strict guardrails such as independent...
Organized Crime and Governance in Latin America (Video)
In early 2026 the United States pivoted to a militarized, inter‑agency crackdown that fuses counter‑terrorism and counter‑cartel tactics across Latin America. The New Lines Institute launched its Mafiacracies Project, convening experts to examine how criminal syndicates are infiltrating or co‑opting...
Total Defense and OSINT: The Role of Citizens in Modern Warfare
Recent analyses in the Special Warfare Journal and Small Wars Journal argue that modern warfare increasingly relies on civilians to provide open‑source intelligence. The Total Defense framework treats citizens as sensors, a model validated by Ukraine’s smartphone app that crowdsourced...
Decentralize or Defeat: How Institutional Ego Slows U.S. Military Intelligence
The Ukraine war has shown that cheap, commercial drones can replace costly, centralized U.S. ISR platforms, delivering real‑time intelligence directly to platoon and company commanders. By fielding $2,000 drones that cost a fraction of a $30 million MQ‑9 Reaper, Ukrainian forces...
The U.S. Should Establish an Anti-Etela’at Channel in Iran
The article argues that Iran’s pervasive intelligence network, known as Etela’at, underpins the regime’s resilience despite recent military setbacks. It proposes that the United States create a secure, anonymous reporting channel enabling ordinary Iranians to share intelligence with opposition groups....
The U.S. Army War College Quarterly- Parameters (Spring 2026)
The U.S. Army War College released the Spring 2026 issue of *Parameters*, featuring a special commentary on denial strategies, three thematic forums, and a Strategic Competition Corner. The Clausewitz forum revisits the trinity concept, linking it to modern leadership and...
Jim Mattis & Ryan Holiday: War, Strategy, and Stoic Leadership
In a PBS interview, retired General James Mattis warned that Iran’s regime conducts a total war against its own citizens and the United States, noting the regime’s durability despite internal fragility. He criticized U.S. military strategy as murky, lacking a clear...
What I Learned From Being a Planner in an Advisory Command: Reflections From the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine
The Security Assistance Group‑Ukraine (SAG‑U) spent six months coordinating training and equipment for Kyiv, confronting the unique demands of advisory planning. Planners had to juggle three major actors—U.S., Ukrainian, and Russian forces—while lacking direct command over Ukrainian units. To cope,...
Greenland and Strategic North American Defense in the 21st Century
Since President Trump took office in 2025, the United States has elevated nuclear modernization and missile‑defense priorities, casting Greenland into the spotlight. Pituffik Space Base now operates an Upgraded Early Warning Radar capable of detecting launches over 3,000 miles away,...
Fire Detection as a Proxy for Combat: The Economist
The Economist used NASA’s FIRMS satellite fire detection system combined with a 100‑model machine‑learning filter to identify war‑related heat signatures in Ukraine. By requiring 95 of 100 models to flag an anomaly, the approach isolates artillery, drone and missile strikes...
Terrorist Innovation Model and Drone Adoption Explained | GNET Insights
The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) released a study outlining a Terrorist Innovation Model that explains how groups like ISIS and Al‑Qaeda adopt emerging technologies, especially drones, through adaptation rather than invention. The model separates intrinsic factors—strategic goals,...
March to the Sound of the Guns: Organizational Integration for Strategic Competition
The U.S. Army recognizes a doctrinal gap in integrating information operations into strategic competition and proposes a new organizational model that mirrors close‑air‑support (CAS) structures. By embedding information‑warfare professionals within State Department regional bureaus and key embassies, the Army aims...
3/23/26 National Security and Korean News and Commentary
On March 23, 2026 Small Wars Journal published a comprehensive roundup of national‑security and Korean‑related commentary. The collection highlights escalating U.S. concerns over Iran—including regime‑change debates, hybrid warfare analysis, and President Trump’s shifting stance on Iranian energy strikes—while also flagging...
Communicative Deterrence in the Information Environment | Irregular Warfare Center
Dr. Rupinder Mangat of Defence Research and Development Canada proposes “communicative deterrence,” a framework that leverages strategic communication to build societal resilience against adversarial information operations. The model treats resilience as deterrence by denial, arguing that a public that can...
The Rise of Non-State Special Operations | The War Room Podcast
The War Room Podcast episode highlights the growing capability of non‑state actors—terrorist groups, cartels, and private contractors—to conduct complex, high‑impact special operations traditionally reserved for nation‑states. Professor Craig Whiteside and host Darrell Driver discuss historical examples such as the Tet...
Russia’s Spring Offensive Begins Against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt: ISW
The Institute for the Study of War says Russian forces have launched a spring‑summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s “Fortress Belt” in Donetsk, focusing on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Initial operations are in a shaping phase, with probing attacks and intensified strikes...
The Architecture of Resistance: Why Iran’s Ideological Statecraft Outlasts Nuclear Diplomacy
The article argues that Iran’s revolutionary constitution embeds a permanent mandate to support global “oppressed” movements, making its ideological statecraft more enduring than any nuclear agreement. While the 2015 JCPOA limited Tehran’s fissile capabilities, Iran simultaneously advanced missile, space, and...
Afghanistan’s Political Stalemate: Risks to Regional and Global Security
Afghanistan’s political deadlock is deepening humanitarian crises and creating a strategic vacuum that threatens regional stability. Nearly half of the population now requires urgent aid, while exclusionary governance fuels extremist networks and mass displacement. The article argues that Western disengagement...
2026 Annual Threat Assessment (ODNI) – What Has Changed Since 2024?
On March 18 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, describing a security environment where major powers, transnational actors, and rapid technological change intersect. China remains the primary strategic competitor, while Russia, Iran...
Chinese Eyes, Iranian Missiles: Intelligence Cooperation in the US/Israel–Iran War 2026
The 2026 US‑Israel‑Iran conflict revealed Iran’s unusually precise missile and drone strikes, prompting analysts to trace the capability to Chinese intelligence support. China supplied satellite imagery, BeiDou navigation, advanced radar and electronic‑warfare tools that augment Iran’s targeting and air‑defense networks....
A Contest of Wills: China and the Quad
The United States faces a strategic inflection as China expands its economic and military reach across the Indo‑Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Beijing’s infrastructure investments in ports, minerals and overseas bases give it leverage over junior partners while the People’s...
ASU News: US Army Enlists ASU to Help Modernize Military Learning
Arizona State University has entered a strategic partnership with the U.S. Army to overhaul the service’s learning and leadership development programs. The collaboration originated from a meeting between ASU President Michael Crow and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A....
The Value of EURO-SOF
The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy re‑prioritizes global threats, positioning U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Europe as a critical deterrent against Russia and emerging challenges from China, Iran and North Korea. SOF’s value proposition hinges on deterrence by denial—maintaining...
Narrative as a Weapon: Russian, Iranian, and Chinese Approaches to Cognitive Warfare
Operation Doppelgänger, a Kremlin‑linked influence campaign run by the Social Design Agency from 2022‑2024, fabricated news sites and used bots to push pro‑Russian narratives. Russia, Iran and China each employ cognitive warfare—weaponized narratives, AI‑generated media, and state‑controlled outlets—to shape perceptions...
FPV Drones and the Exposure of U.S. Airbases
A first‑person FPV drone hovered for nearly two minutes over the U.S. Victory Base in Iraq, surveyed the site and struck without being detected. The attack demonstrated how low‑cost, fiber‑optic‑guided drones can combine intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) with precision...
Disrupting Illicit Markets: Cognitive Warfare and the Fight Against Drug Cartels
The Irregular Warfare Center proposes a cognitive‑warfare framework to counter drug cartels by reshaping the economic and psychological incentives that sustain illicit markets. It argues that traditional counter‑terrorism tactics miss the core drivers of organizations like the CJNG, which blend...
Panoceanic Navy Strategy | USNI Proceedings
The March 2026 USNI Proceedings article argues the U.S. Navy must abandon its traditional transoceanic power‑projection model and adopt a “panoceanic” doctrine centered on sea control and denial, driven by China’s expanding fleet. Commander Jeff Vandenengel describes a “Pacific Phase”...
Lessons From Ukraine on Cognitive Warfare: Journal of Strategic Security
A 2025 Journal of Strategic Security report by Briggs and Tusor examines Ukraine’s war as a case study in cognitive warfare, highlighting how Russia employs cyber attacks, disinformation, private militias, and religious channels to manipulate perception. The authors detail Ukraine’s...
Proxy Warfare: The Missing Facet of Australian Defence Policy
Andrew Maher’s March 2026 article warns that Australian defence policy has largely abandoned proxy warfare, a tool once central to the nation’s World‑II and early Cold‑War strategies. The piece documents a literature gap after 1975, despite the resurgence of gray‑zone...
A 2016 Warning About Weaponized Drones: The Army’s Early sUAS Threat Experiment
In August 2016 the U.S. Army Systems Adaptive Red Team ran the UAS Threat Experiment 2‑16, using off‑the‑shelf drones to simulate attacks on convoys and urban targets. The trials examined improvised explosive payloads, autonomous targeting of moving vehicles, and command‑and‑control...
Beyond the Menu of Options: A Taxonomy for Information Security Strategies
The paper introduces a three‑tier taxonomy for information security, categorizing approaches as reactive defensive, proactive defensive, and offensive measures. It argues that current counter‑disinformation efforts lack a coherent framework, hindering strategic evaluation and resource allocation. Case studies of Taiwan, Finland,...
3/15/26 National Security and Korean News and Commentary
The March 15 2026 roundup highlights a surge in U.S. defense spending and technology integration, most notably a contract worth up to $20 billion with Anduril for autonomous systems. It also details the deployment of the Typhon missile family capable of striking targets...
Congress Must Rein in Drone Diplomacy for Security Cooperation Before It Backfires
U.S. intelligence and Customs agencies are deploying MQ‑9 Predator drones to monitor Mexico’s northern border in support of fentanyl interdiction and broader domain awareness. The CIA’s covert surveillance program, expanded under the Trump administration, operates alongside CBP’s domestic ISR missions,...
Criminal Governance and Strategic Competition: Redefining Irregular Warfare in Mexico
The United States has designated major Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, marking a doctrinal shift that treats organized crime as an irregular warfare problem. Washington now argues that cartels function as coercive campaigners, displacing state authority over strategic...
The Kremlin’s Cognitive Assault on Europe
The article outlines how the Kremlin conducts a coordinated cognitive warfare campaign across Europe, using a "firehose of falsehood" approach to flood audiences with pro‑Russian narratives. It details how Russian disinformation infiltrated German political discourse, culminating in the AfD‑driven cancellation...
How Russia Leveraged Asian Partnerships in the Ukraine War
Russia has built a flexible, deniable network of Asian partnerships to compensate for battlefield losses and sanctions. North Korea contributes artillery shells and troops, Iran supplies drones and missiles, and China provides dual‑use high‑tech components, while India and China purchase...
America Needs a War Tax
The 43‑day 2025 government shutdown froze U.S. military pay, training, and civilian support, exposing a critical reliance on a fragile appropriations process. In response, the article proposes a dedicated war tax and a sovereign‑wealth‑style National Defense Trust Fund to insulate...
Governing Cognitive Warfare at Ecosystem Speed: Why America Can’t Organize for Influence—And What It Takes to Compete
The United States possesses sophisticated intelligence, diplomatic, and military tools for cognitive warfare, but its fragmented governance prevents rapid, coordinated action. Historical attempts—psychological strategy boards, the USIA, and ad‑hoc task forces—failed because they lacked sustained authority, legitimacy, and integration across...
Munich 2026: The Turning that Didn’t Start This Year
The 2026 Munich Security Conference served as a diagnostic barometer, revealing that the post‑World War II Western order is not collapsing but facing deep‑seated fragility. Delegates highlighted the cumulative impact of eroding arms‑control regimes, weaponized economic interdependence, great‑power rivalry, and internal...
WEBINAR (3/11/26): Vigilance Is Not Enough: A History of United States Intelligence
The Michael V. Hayden Center at George Mason University is hosting a live‑streamed and in‑person webinar on March 11, 2026, featuring intelligence veteran Dr. Mark Lowenthal. Lowenthal will discuss his new book, Vigilance Is Not Enough: A History of United...
VIDEO: JSOU Snapshot: Chinese Influence and Cognitive Warfare
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) released a short video titled “Chinese Influence and Cognitive Warfare,” examining how Beijing designs and deploys influence campaigns against adversaries. The piece outlines China’s long‑standing focus on controlling narratives both at home and abroad,...