Yao Yang: The Post-2018 Evolution in China's Political Economy

Key Takeaways

• Reform era ended 2018, shifting to manufacturing focus.
• Anti‑corruption, deleveraging, housing crackdown target excesses.
• China pushes self‑reliant high‑tech, zero‑to‑one innovation.
• Manufacturing aims to dominate global output, support military.
• U.S.–China ties hinge on tech competition and Taiwan.

Summary

At a Long U.S.–China Institute distinguished lecture on Feb. 23, 2026, Professor Yao Yang argued that China’s reform‑and‑opening period effectively concluded in 2018, ushering a new era focused on manufacturing expansion and technological self‑reliance. He outlined domestic policy shifts—including anti‑corruption drives, deleveraging, housing and platform crackdowns—to correct perceived excesses of the previous decades. Yao linked these internal reforms to China’s strategic goals of strengthening its military and achieving reunification with Taiwan, framing U.S.–China relations as a high‑stakes technology and industrial competition. He presented three possible scenarios for future bilateral engagement, ranging from status‑quo stability to a negotiated peaceful resolution over Taiwan.

Pulse Analysis

China’s post‑2018 turn marks a deliberate departure from the market‑first reforms that propelled its rise. By re‑centralizing economic direction, Beijing aims to eliminate what it sees as the “excesses” of financialization, speculative real‑estate, and over‑powered platform firms. This recalibration is not merely ideological; it reflects a strategic calculus to marshal resources toward heavy industry and breakthrough technologies, positioning the nation to meet its 2035 self‑reliance targets while reinforcing the industrial base needed for modern warfare.

The policy sweep has immediate ramifications for global investors and supply‑chain planners. Anti‑corruption campaigns and aggressive deleveraging have tightened credit for financial firms, while housing sector reforms curb speculative demand, potentially slowing construction‑related exports. Simultaneously, state‑driven investment in “zero‑to‑one” innovation—ranging from semiconductors to advanced materials—creates new opportunities for foreign firms that can navigate China’s regulatory environment. Companies in sectors such as electric vehicles, battery production, and high‑end manufacturing must reassess market entry strategies as China seeks to internalize critical inputs and reduce dependence on Western technology.

The domestic shift reverberates through the fraught U.S.–China relationship. As Beijing builds a more self‑sufficient tech ecosystem, Washington faces heightened pressure to tighten export controls, a move that could accelerate the very decoupling Beijing seeks to avoid. Yao Yang’s three‑scenario outlook—from minimal engagement to a negotiated Taiwan settlement—highlights the diplomatic stakes. A stable status‑quo would preserve existing trade flows, while a cooperative middle ground could unlock Chinese investment in U.S. green‑tech sectors. Conversely, a confrontational path would likely intensify competition for global manufacturing dominance and amplify geopolitical risk, underscoring the importance of nuanced policy responses on both sides.